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Empirical data of supermarket sales show stylised facts that are similar to stock markets, 
with a broad (truncated) Lévy distribution of weekly sales differences in the baseline sales 
[R.D. Groot, Physica A 353 (2005) 501]. To investigate the cause of this, the influence of 
social interactions and advertisements are studied in an agent-based model of consumers in 
a social network. The influence of network topology was varied by using a small-world 
network, a random network and a Barabási-Albert network. The degree to which consumers 
value the opinion of their peers was also varied.  
 
On a small-world and random network we find a phase-transition between an open market 
and a locked-in market that is similar to condensation in liquids. At the critical point, 
fluctuations become large and buying behaviour is strongly correlated. However, on the 
small world network the noise distribution at the critical point is Gaussian, and critical slowing 
down occurs which is not observed in supermarket sales. On a scale-free network, the 
model shows a transition between a gas-like phase and a glassy state, but at the transition 
point the noise amplitude is much larger than what is seen in supermarket sales. 
 
To explore the role of advertisements, a model is studied where imprints are placed on the 
minds of consumers that ripen when a decision for a product is made. The correct 
distribution of weekly sales returns follows naturally from this model, as well as the noise 
amplitude, the correlation time and cross-correlation of sales fluctuations. For particular 
parameter values, simulated sales correlation shows power law decay in time. The model 
predicts that social interaction helps to prevent aversion, and that products are viewed more 
positively when their consumption rate is higher. 
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1 Introduction 
Financial markets show fluctuations that closely resemble critical fluctuations as seen in 
many physical systems. This correspondence has led to many new insights from physics 
into economy, for instance the Minority Game suggests that markets tend to operate close to 
a critical point via a mechanism that leads to self-organised criticality [1]. Moreover, it has 
been established that stock markets fluctuate between an equilibrium state, and a state with 
a net excess of either buyers of sellers [2], and some simple models have appeared that 
explain the observed power law behaviour in financial indices [3,4]. For manufacturers of 
consumer goods and retailers it could be quite advantageous to apply similar models to 
sales to the consumer [5]. However, apart from a few exceptions [6,7,8,9] there has been 
little effort in modelling consumer behaviour via agent-based models.  
 
A credible model should reproduce actual market data. To characterise the consumer goods 
market, the fluctuations in weekly sales of three related products (ketchup, mayonnaise and 
curry) were analysed recently [10]. Fluctuations in the baseline sales characterise the 
dynamics of the market. Some hitherto unnoticed effects were found that are difficult to 
explain from simple econometric models. In this market the noise level of baseline sales 
appears to be much larger than can be expected from independent sales events. Further, 
the sales differences between successive weeks follow a (truncated) Lévy distribution and 
the auto-correlation of noise decays over a period of some 10 weeks. Finally, a cross-
correlation was found between brands, which decays at the same time scale. These effects 
can be used to test a model. 
 
Several effects may give rise to a power law distribution in sales. One possibility is that the 
market is in a self-organised critical state, and that “avalanches” occur regularly caused by a 
Darwinian evolution mechanism [11,12,13]. However, in models of stock markets like the 
Minority Game, self-organised criticality arises from the competition between agents for 
scarce assets [1]. This may be realistic for investors, but not for consumers who gain little 
from being in the minority. In general, the occurrence of a power law in sales returns follows 
directly from having the right power law distribution of “investor” sizes. If a time series is 
generated by adding random “superspins” at each time step, the resulting signal is truncated 
Lévy distributed, provided that the size of superspins is chosen from the correct power law 
distribution [14,15]. In such a model each superspin represents a cluster of investors whose 
actions are correlated. How these clusters are formed is irrelevant for the resulting noise 
spectrum. 
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Since it was observed that the noise in sales to consumers follow a (truncated) Lévy 
distribution, it can be concluded that consumer actions are correlated in clusters that follow a 
power law distribution. The question thus is: what is the cause of this correlation? Why do 
many consumers take the same decision at the same time? In general the decision of a 
consumer to purchase a particular product depends on habit, social effects, perceived 
product quality, price and advertising exposure [16,17,18]. Two factors here may induce 
correlation between consumers: their being linked in a social network and the stream of 
advertisements leading to common experiences for large groups of consumers. 
 
To study these two factors, a consumer market is simulated by an agent-based model where 
all consumers are linked in a social network. The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 
the choice model that is studied is described. In section 3 we study the influence of network 
topology and of the strength of the social interaction. Next, the effect of collective 
experiences is studied in section 4, and results and conclusions are summarised in section 
5. 
 
2 Modelling Choice 
We simulate the market with a q-state spin model, where Nb = q–1 states are brand choices, 
and the last choice is to buy nothing. The most commonly used model to represent 
consumer choice behaviour is the logit model. In this model, choice is represented by a 
probability P to buy a certain brand b, which depends on the perceived utility ub of the brand 
and on its price pb. The probability that consumer i will choose brand b in the logit model is 
given by [16, 19, 20, 21]: 
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Utility uib in general is a measure of what the consumer i is prepared to pay for a product b, 
i.e. its perceived value. Parameter β in Eq 1 can be interpreted as miserliness and takes a 
role analogous to inverse temperature. When β is small, the consumer does not care about 
price, but rather prefers to seek variety. When β is large the consumer tries to get the best 
product to the lowest price, and doesn’t care about sampling different brands.  
 
In the present investigation we wish to study both the importance of social interactions and 
of advertisements. To study the former, the perceived utility is split in a quality qib that is 
perceived as intrinsic to the brand, and a part that is related to the market share ψib of that 
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product over the peer group of i. The excess of product utility over its price, as perceived by 
consumer i is thus written as [17] 
 ibibibbibib cNpqcpu ψπ +−−=−= )()1(  2 
where Ni is number of peers of consumer i. The social interaction term represents the 
number of times that brand b is observed to be chosen. It describes that the market share ψib 
of brand b over the peer group of consumer i leads to an increase of the perceived product 
value. Parameter c switches between consumers who are independent (c = 0) and those 
who are connected, communicating and co-operative with their network (c = 1). 
 
According to Becker and Murphy [22] the willingness to pay for a product is increased by 
advertisements. This implies that when a (positive) news event arrives at a consumer, it 
raises his/her perception of utility of that brand. To simulate such news events, every 
consumer i retains a perceived quality qib of brand b, which is an accumulation of his/her 
news history. At every time step a set X of the population is randomly selected whose 
perception will be changed. The number of its elements x = |X| is a random variable drawn 
from a power law distribution given below. Every time step one brand b’ is selected at 
random for which a news item will be broadcasted. The consumers who are selected to be 
influenced change their perceived value of the selected brand, i.e. 
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For symmetry, the update variable for the perceptions σ(t) = ±σ  has a randomly selected 
sign, but it is equal for all consumers in that advertisement round. The absolute value σ is a 
fixed parameter and will be taken equal for all consumers. The interpretation of this 
parameter is consumer susceptibility to advertisements. It is the added value of an 
advertisement. After the consumers are ‘seeded’ by good or bad news, they enter a buying 
round in which they decide to buy any of the brands or to buy nothing. The perceived quality 
qib of brand b is reset to zero when it is bought by consumer i.  
 
The source of collective external stimuli captured by Eq (3) could be anything ranging from 
exposure to advertisements and promotional activities, to the daily news. To get a rough 
indication of the importance of endogenous influences, buying behaviour under price 
promotions was analysed for the time series of sales of ketchup, mayonnaise and curry 
sauce in the Netherlands. The data was extracted from an ACNielsen database [23]. The 
data available for this work covers a 120-week period. ACNielsen not only gives the actual 
sales per brand, but also gives separate results for promotion excess sales. Here we 
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analyse these excess sales due to promotions, as this may be an indication of how often 
people are influenced by external stimuli. We hypothesise that the influence under 
advertisements follows the same distribution as that of promotions. 
 
Sales excess under promotion was ranked to size x. If the probability density to have sales x 
is given by ρ(x), the ranking number of a promotion is ∫∞= x dxxxn )()( ρ , hence the derivative of 
the ranking number to sales gives the probability density ρ(x). For all products studied we 
thus find that the frequency of influential events roughly follows 
 06.1~)( −xxρ  4 
Note that this exponent 1.06 is much smaller than the critical percolation exponent γ = 2.5 
that is used in the Cont-Bouchaud model to describe the distribution of investor sizes [14]. 
Montroll and Shlesinger [24] pointed out that if a random process P = P1P2P3..Pn is the 
product of many independent random processes, the variable P will be distributed log-
normal. This may explain the apparent hyperbolic power law. For some 80% of all 
promotions the cumulative distribution n(x) is proportional to the logarithm of their size x, 
implying a hyperbolic law for the probability density as in Eq (4). Hence, a power law 
distribution according to Eq (4) was hypothesised for the impact of advertisements and the 
consequences of such power law are studied. 
 
The simulation contains Nb brands and Nc consumers. At each time step every consumer i 
makes only one choice b out of the set {none, brand 1, …, brand Nb} leaving out the previous 
choice. The previous choice can be either a brand, or not to buy anything. Whether this 
switch is accepted or the previous choice is retained, depends on whether the perceived 
value, πib goes up or down relative to the current perceived value of the latest choice. If πib 
increases, the new choice is accepted immediately, but if πib decreases the new choice is 
accepted with probability 
 )](exp[)( oldib
new
ibacceptP ππβ −=  5 
which is the standard Metropolis Monte carlo algorithm. To set the fraction of non-buyers in 
the system, each consumer has a personal quality standard. Every time a product is 
consumed, the standard is increased by a random number taken from (0, δ), where δ = 
0.5(Nc−M)/Nc and every time the consumer refrains from consuming his standard is 
decreased by an amount (−ε, 0), where ε = 0.5M/Nc. This mechanism self-adjusts to a 
desired market volume M, even though the total market volume is not fixed. The quality 
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reference performs the function of defining the utility (or chemical potential) of not buying, i.e. 
it is substituted in Eq 5 for πibnew if the new choice is “none”. 
 
Since the utility of products in this model is partly imputed via their use in the peer group of a 
consumer, all consumers are placed in a network. As it is not apparent which network 
topology is pertinent for consumer interactions, some choices have been studied. These are 
the small-world network [25,26], the Barabási-Albert network [27] and a random network. 
Results for these networks are described in the next section. 
 
3 Sales without advertisements 
In these simulations 3000 consumers are grouped in a circle, where each agent is 
connected to four nearest neighbours. A random fraction of 3% of the connections are 
broken, and rewired to a randomly chosen other agent. Hence, the network can be 
characterised as a 1+ε dimensional small-world network. We arbitrarily put the inverse 
temperature at β = 2, and vary the value of the consumer co-operativity c. Prices are taken 
as fixed random numbers between pb = 0 and pb = 1. The market contains Nb = 10 brands. 
The actual chosen set of prices is {pb} = {0.119, 0.161, 0.289, 0.497, 0.524, 0.631, 0.747, 
0.839, 0.962, 0.975}. 
 
In figure 1a the evolution of sales is shown for c = 0. All consumers act independently from 
the others. Figure 1b shows a simulation on the same 3000 virtual consumers, and on the 
same brands, but now the consumer perception of the product value is for 40% determined 
by the price of the product, and for 60% it is determined by what the others buy (c = 0.6). A 
few top brands are established that do well, whereas all other brands are strongly reduced in 
market share. Moreover, by introducing social utility, the fluctuations in the top brand market 
share are largely increased. Such fluctuations are usually seen in real market share data 
[10]. Finally in Fig 1c an example is given where c = 0.75, in which the top-brand gains 
nearly complete market dominance. At roughly c = 0.7 the system has a transition point that 
resembles a phase transition, where it shows a maximum in volatility, see Figure 2. 
 
At this maximum, the amplitude of sales fluctuations is some 10% of sales for the top brand. 
This is realistic compared to sales in the ketchup market. However, when we study the noise 
distribution of sales, we find a marked difference between the real sales data to consumers 
and the present simulations at the “critical” point, see Figure 3. Whereas empirical sales data 
shows a power law distribution of fluctuations, closely resembling a truncated Lévy 
distribution, the simulation on the present small-world network has Gaussian fluctuations. 
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Increasing the number of consumer by a factor of 10 has no influence on the shape of the 
noise spectrum, it remains Gaussian. This means that the model may have a realistic noise 
amplitude, but the large peaks in sales that characterise the consumer data are missing. The 
implication is that the underlying model is not a realistic model for the way consumers 
operate, or for the way they are placed in a network.  
 
The situation on a 2+ε dimensional small-world network, which is made by rewiring 3% of 
the connections of a 2D network, are qualitatively similar. The volatility at the critical point 
has a sharper maximum as function of c, but the fluctuations at the critical point still follow a 
Gaussian distribution. Also when the buying frequency is lowered a factor of ten, Gaussian 
noise is found. Simulations have also been done on a random network with a stretched 
exponential connectivity distribution. The network was built by rewiring a Barabási-Albert 
network, using a Verlet neighbour list [28] (see Appendix). The same set of brands was used 
as before. This network shows mean-field behaviour, with a strong first order phase 
transition and hysteresis behaviour, see Figure 4. The drawn curves are mean-field results, 
obtained from solving 
 ∑ −−
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where the number of neighbours per agent was set on its mean value Ni = 4.  
 
In the thermodynamic limit the Ising model on the small-world network [29] shows mean-field 
behaviour with classical exponents at the critical point for every rewiring fraction. Since the 
underlying reason this is the topology of the small-world network [30], the same must hold 
for the q-state spin model. This excludes the present q-state choice model on any small-
world network as describing consumer choice behaviour, which indicates that some crucial 
factor must be missing in this model. Moreover, this model shows critical slowing down at 
the critical point, which is not seen in supermarket sales.  
 
Sales fluctuations of consumer products might be (truncated) Lévy distributed because the 
network of consumer relations is strongly inhomogeneous. Therefore, we also studied sales 
on a directed Barabási-Albert network [27]. Here the probability for any node in the network 
of having k connections to others decays as 
 γ−∝ kkP )(  7 
RD Groot, Social networks and advertisement effects in consumer choice 
 8
When the number of connections between consumers follows a power law, this implies that 
also the influence of any person on all others in the network follows a power law. This may 
have profound influence on buying behaviour, as the ones who have many connections act 
as key opinion formers. Indeed, buying behaviour on this network is markedly different from 
that on a small-world network. Simulations were run with the same product prices as before, 
and β = 2. Again a network of 3000 agents was generated with connectivity m = 4 (see 
Appendix). Agents only take advice from their Ni = m = 4 outgoing links. 
 
In Figure 5 consumer co-operativity is increased from the left to the right, it varies as c = 0.1, 
0.5 and 0.7. For low co-operativity the market shows few fluctuations, like on the small world 
network. When c = 0.5, the buying behaviour is very chaotic. Short fashions can be 
distinguished, but the market is never stable. If consumers are highly co-operative, the 
market is characterised by longer fashions, where nearly all consumers are converted to the 
same brand. The main effect of increasing c above c = 0.5 is to increase the time for which a 
certain fashion lasts. All markets for c > 0.5 demonstrate this behaviour, which resembles a 
glassy state. The system does not show phase separation behaviour like on the small-world 
network, instead the system swaps between different product fashions, where typically 98% 
of the consumers buy the same product. After a certain period of time, all consumers switch 
to another product. Examples of such transitions are shown in Figure 5c. This phenomenon 
is entirely driven by herding behaviour, price and quality are irrelevant as transitions occur 
from cheap to expensive brands and vice versa.  
 
The distributions of sales difference between successive measurements are shown in Figure 
6 for systems of c = 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7. The dots in this figure are obtained from real weekly 
sales differences of ketchup, mayonnaise and curry sauce to Dutch consumers, averaged 
over a period of 118 weeks [10]. The simulated distributions again show a marked difference 
for c < 0.5 and c > 0.5. For co-operativity below c = 0.5 the noise distribution roughly follows 
a stretched exponential decay, P(x) ∝ exp(−xα) where 0.7 < α < 2.0. At c = 0.5 it follows a 
(truncated) Lévy distribution, crossing over to a steeper power-law decay, P(x) ~ x−3.7, 
probably due to finite size effects. For c > 0.5 the distribution shows a fast initial decay, then 
a plateau, and finally a power law decay. The point c = 0.5 appears to be close to a 
transition point separating a glassy system from a non-glassy system. This transition point is 
markedly non-classical, given the broad noise distribution. Without any fitting parameters, 
the shape of the distribution at the transition point matches the noise distribution seen in 
consumer sales data. However, the noise amplitude is much higher than what is seen in a 
typical consumer market, some 80% of the market share for the top three brands, whereas 
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this is 8 to 12 % in the supermarket [10]. The noise amplitude in the simulation is hardly 
dependent on the number of consumers in the simulation, or on the time span over which 
sales are averaged for each measurement. There is apparently no parameter set in this 
model that matches all empirical data. 
 
4 Sales with advertisements 
In this section the present market model will be compared to actual market data, to see if it is 
possible to reproduce the noise spectrum, noise amplitude and correlation functions as 
appear in a real market. To this end we simulate the Dutch ketchup market, where four 
brands are active with a total sales of about 71000 bottles a week. Simulations were done in 
the parameter range between c = 0 and c = 0.5. The market size M was put at an average of 
M = 11800 bottles per day, and sales over six days were added to obtain weekly sales. A 
good or bad news item about one brand is disseminated daily. For each value of the 
consumer co-operativity, price variables were fixed to reproduce the market shares of four 
brands (see Table I). For all simulations miserliness was taken as β = 2, and the marketing 
susceptibility σ was chosen to match the sales auto-correlation function. Simulations were 
run on a (1+ε) dimensional small-world network with 3% rewiring and on average Ni = 4 
neighbours per agent. 
 
Generally, power law noise only occurs when the market is sufficiently large, otherwise the 
rare extreme events are not sampled adequately [31,32]. Therefore we first check on finite 
size effects. In these simulations the social co-operativity was fixed at c = 0.3, the noise 
amplitude was taken as σ = 0.173, and Nc was varied as Nc = 465, 4650, 15500 and 46500 
agents and for each market M = 0.254Nc bottles per day. At this point the simulated market 
size equals that of the real market, though the buying frequency is unrealistic. The 
distributions of sales differences between consecutive weeks for these runs are shown in 
Figure 7. For comparison, the dashed curve is a Lévy distribution of exponent α = 1.4. The 
actual noise distribution obtained from ketchup, mayonnaise and curry sauce markets is 
shown by the full dots with error bars. An excellent match with the empirical data is obtained. 
At the prices {0.0, 0.219, 0.319, 0.372} we find the market shares and fluctuation amplitudes, 
in simulation and in the real market as given in Table I. The shape of the noise distribution 
follows naturally from the power law assumed in the promotional effectiveness. When the 
power –1 in Eq 7 is replaced by the percolation exponent –2.5, as in the Cont-Bouchaud 
model [14], the noise distribution is too narrow to fit the market.  
 
To further compare the simulations to market data we study the correlation functions: 
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where is  is a time average of sales si(t) over the interval 0 < t < T–τ, and js  is a time 
average of sales sj(t) over the interval τ < t < T. The correlation function depends on whether 
or not the empirical data is detrended. By analysing simulated time series over 118-week 
periods with and without detrending the data, the correct correlation functions can be 
estimated reasonably well by taking a linear combination of detrended and non-detrended 
correlation functions, such that the correlation function vanishes after 30 weeks. This 
procedure was subsequently used to analyse the empirical market data. The results are 
shown in Figure 8, and are compared with the simulated correlation functions. At the 
parameter value where the market dynamics for ketchup sales is reproduced, social effects 
determine product utility for roughly 50%. 
 
Social effect particularly influence the cross-correlation between the three lower brands. If 
we take c = 0, the cross-correlation functions in the simulation are negative, whereas this is 
clearly positive in the market. To arrive at the same fluctuation amplitude without social 
interaction, the noise level was increased to σ = 0.22 and the number of consumers was 
taken as Nc = 48000. For these parameters the auto-correlation decays with a power law of 
time, as C(t) ~ t–0.78, see Figure 9. This result is based on a run of 5×105 time steps after an 
equilibration over 6000 steps. Even though this run is quite long, there is still a slight 
difference between the correlation functions obtained from detrending the data and not 
detrending. In the latter case a slightly less negative power C(t) ~ t–0.68 is obtained. In the 
present simulations, big (exogenous) shocks must dominate the correlation function, 
therefore we should expect [33] C(t) ~ t–(1–θ) from which we find θ = 0.27±0.05. This result is 
identical to the result obtained by Sornette et al for exogenous shocks in book sales [34]. 
Further increasing the number of consumers and noise amplitude to Nc = 52840 and σ = 
0.28 leads to a power law correlation C(t) ~ t–0.4, see Figure 9. For these parameters the 
noise amplitude is about twice as high as in the real ketchup market. Remarkably, this power 
law is identical to the result obtained by Sornette et al for endogenous shocks [34], but this 
correspondence may be fortuitous.  
 
In the present model, long time correlation develops because a fraction of consumers 
develops a particularly negative view of some brands. This can be studied by making a 
histogram of the number of times a particular value for the perceived product quality qib 
occurs. This is averaged over all brands for each consumer and shown in Figure 10. When 
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the agents ignore the behaviour of others, this is their actual perception of a brand. For a 
brand that is perceived as very negative by some agents, buying probability decreases 
exponentially as P(i,b) ∝ exp(βqib), hence those agents avoid buying these brands. 
Consequently, their negative views are never corrected. Only when by chance their 
perceived quality diffuses back to less negative values and they happen to buy the product, 
their perception is reset. These persistent negative views apparently lead to long time 
correlations. When the agents do value the behaviour of others (c = 0.3), brand quality is 
also determined by what the neighbours do. As a result, very negative prejudices have a 
much smaller tendency to develop. In the latter case no power law correlation develops (as 
in Figure 9), but the correlation decays exponentially, see Figure 8.  
 
5 Summary 
In this paper the importance of social interaction between consumers and of collective 
marketing effects have been studied by simulation of the choice process. Agents were 
placed in a small world network, a random network and in a scale-free network. They 
interact with their peers by exchanging information on the latest brand choice. To study the 
effect of advertisements and other common experiences amongst the consumers, a model is 
introduced where advertisements lead to collective imprints that ripen at the decision point. 
The simulations are compared to sales data of ketchup on the Dutch market. 
 
On the small-world network a transition is found between lock-in and an open market. In a 
lock-in situation one market leader dominates the market and all other brands remain small. 
This occurs when consumers tend to copy the behaviour of their neighbours and want the 
best value for their money. This is the market analogue of condensation in liquids. An open 
market arises when consumers ignore what their friends buy. At the transition between these 
two extremes, fluctuations in the market become large and buying behaviour becomes 
strongly correlated. However, the sales fluctuations seen in the real market cannot have their 
origin in this criticality for two reasons. Firstly, the critical point on a small-world network as 
studied here has Gaussian fluctuations. Secondly, at the critical point the simulations show 
critical slowing down, which is not seen in consumer markets.  
 
On the Barabási-Albert network, people tend to follow the behaviour of a few key opinion 
formers. When this influence is strong the market drops into a glassy state where the market 
leader attains nearly complete market dominance. In this state fashions alternate. When 
consumers put little weight on the opinion of their peers, products are chosen according to 
the logit distribution of their price. In between, the system shows critical behaviour with 
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fluctuations well characterised by a truncated Lévy distribution. However, the amplitude of 
the fluctuations is much higher than what is seen in the market, and moreover the noise 
distribution spectrum could only be reproduced when the parameters of the model are fine-
tuned to a particular value. Hence the broad fluctuation spectrum seen in supermarket sales 
is neither caused by near neighbour interactions between consumers, nor by the network 
topology in which they are connected. For this reason, exogenous causes for the observed 
sales noise spectrum are considered. A likely cause for correlation between consumers is 
collective imprints by advertisements. 
 
The distribution of sales under promotion is taken as a model for collective experiences that 
change behaviour. The probability of such events is roughly inversely proportional to the size 
of the event. This apparent hyperbolic law might be explained by the fact that each 
advertisement event only influences a particular consumer when a large chain of 
independent switches is satisfied. When this power-law of collective experiences is put into 
the model, the correct distribution of weekly sales returns is reproduced directly. The correct 
power law is obtained for the weekly sales returns. At the parameter value where the market 
dynamics for ketchup sales is reproduced, social effects in this model determine product 
utility for roughly 50%. This correspondence does not prove that the model is correct, but so 
far it is consistent with the empirical data. 
 
Even though this is a very simple model of the mind, it leads to a very rich phenomenology. 
A remarkable result is obtained when the distribution of perceptions is studied. Positive 
prejudices towards a brand are very short lived, as the agents immediately buy these 
products and therewith readjust their perception. Negative prejudices however can be very 
long lived, as the agents avoid those products. Persistent negative views particularly build up 
when agents operate in isolation, but when they take into account the behaviour of their 
peers to value a product, the development of extremely negative views is prevented. The 
reason for this is that copying peer behaviour leads to a frequent exposure to the product, 
which corrects negative prejudices. Thus the model predicts that social interaction can 
prevent the development of extreme views, that aversion is more often developed when the 
buying frequency is lower, and that aversion is developed towards the unknown. When 
consumers do not value the buying behaviour of their peers, sales auto-correlation and 
cross-correlation develop power laws of time, that depend on the parameter values. Powers 
observed in the simulation are identical to the power laws observed in the decay of 
endogenous and exogenous shocks in book sales [34]. The appearance of power laws 
suggests a self-organised critical state, like in the avalanche model [11].  
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Appendix. A fast algorithm to generate a Barabási-Albert network 
The Barabási-Albert network [27] is formed by adding new nodes one by one to an existing 
network. Each new node is connected to m existing nodes. However, the probability to 
connect to a particular node depends on the number of connections that the latter already 
has. If node i is connected to the network by ki links then the probability that j connects to i is 
given by 
 ∑
<
=
jl
l
i
k
kiP )(  A1 
In social terms, people will listen preferentially to influential people. A fast algorithm to 
generate such a network is the following. Each person i in an existing network has m 
outgoing connections and ki – m incoming connections (persons listening to i). To add a new 
person n to an existing network, take any randomly chosen person i and consider randomly 
one of his/her m outgoing links connecting i to j (i takes advice of j). With probability 0.5 
connect n to i, otherwise connect n to j.  
 
This procedure leads to the correct distribution given by Eq A1, because all links are 
sampled with equal probability. The probability to arrive at a particular person is therefore 
proportional to the number of departing links m plus the number of arriving links ki – m. Since 
both ends of the link are taken with equal probability the total probability to choose a 
particular person is proportional to ki. This procedure solves the obvious problem: how do 
people know how often anybody is connected to the network? Without citation index they 
don’t know. An obvious generalisation of this procedure is to follow the advice of the first 
arbitrary person with probability f (i.e. connect to j) and connect to i himself with probability 
(1–f). For f = 0.5 this leads to the original Barabási-Albert network with exponent γ = 3.0 
when the number of nodes is large (105-106). For f = 0.7 a slightly lower exponent γ = 2.4 is 
found, which is close to the actor network.  
 
When rewiring is introduced in a fully-grown network, the topology changes significantly. To 
model this, all agents die in a random sequence. When an agent i dies, its connections are 
broken, and all ki – m bereaved agents find a new connection according to the procedure 
described above. Finally the deceased agent is reborn and chooses new connections to the 
network. When this procedure is repeated for some generations a stable distribution of the 
number of nodes per link emerges. For this network the distribution of connections is no 
longer algebraically decaying, but it appears to decay as a stretched exponential,  
RD Groot, Social networks and advertisement effects in consumer choice 
 15
 )5.1exp(5.4)( 54.0kkN −≈  A2 
More in general, rewiring by birth-and-death increases the exponent γ in Eq 9, or for small f it 
destroys the power-law behaviour altogether.  
 
The network can also be rewired while it is being grown. In that case, at every step a choice 
is made between adding a new node with probability (1–r) or rewiring an existing node with 
probability r. To this end, a node i is selected randomly from the nodes that have been 
defined already, and this node is given new outgoing connections while the incoming 
connections remain intact. Generating a network with rewire probability r = 0.5 appears to 
lead to the same network as obtained after many generations of death and birth, in which 
both outgoing and incoming connections are broken. 
 
To keep tack of all links we use a Verlet neighbour list, as commonly used in the simulation 
of liquids [28]. This is however not necessary to generate the initial network, it is only 
necessary if the grown network is to be rewired afterwards using the birth-and-death 
algorithm. To grow the initial network the outgoing links are stored in an array out[Nc][m], and 
for every agent i we remember how many other agents N[i] point to i. This is enough 
information to form the network, since we only follow outgoing links to form the network.  
 
After the initial network is generated, the neighbour list is generated. This is an array 
neighbour[mNc] of size mNc that contains the label numbers of the incoming neighbours that 
point to any node. The neighbours of i are stored in the elements neighbour[pointer[i]] up to 
neighbour[pointer[i]+N[i]–1], where pointer[i] = Σj<i N[j] points to the begin point where the 
information for node i is stored. The array is filled by first setting up these pointers, then 
resetting the connection array N[i], and finally running through the outgoing connections. If j 
connects to i = out[j][k], we add 1 to N[i], and store j in neighbour[pointer[i]+N[i]-1]. When all 
outgoing links are checked this way, the connection array N[i] is restored again. 
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Table and Figures 
 
Table I. Summary of actual and simulated market shares and fluctuation amplitudes. 
Figure 1 Market shares for ten brands of randomly chosen price at c = 0 (left, all consumers 
act independently), c = 0.6 (middle), and c = 0.75 (right, product value is for 75% determined 
by market share under peers). 
Figure 2 Market share of ten brands as function of the consumer co-operativity c, their 
propensity to follow their peers. Low c means consumers are independent, high c means 
consumers are connected and co-operative. The dashed curve is the relative fluctuation 
amplitude of the market leader.  
Figure 3 Noise distribution of sales returns for consumer data (o) and simulation on small-
world network (∆) at its critical point. 
Figure 4 Market share of ten brands as function of the consumer co-operativity c on a 
random network. Brand prices are the same as in Figure 2. Curves are based on mean-field 
theory, Eq 6. Note the hysteresis behaviour, indicating a strong first order phase transition. 
Figure 5 Typical patterns of buying behaviour on Barabási-Albert network for consumer co-
operativity c = 0.1, 0.5 and 0.7, at β = 2. 
Figure 6 Sales difference distribution on a Barabási-Albert network for c = 0.3, 0.5 (full 
curve) and 0.7. The dots are results from consumer sales data. 
Figure 7 Noise distribution in simulated sales returns for 465 (squares), 4650, 15500 and 
46500 (circles) agents, showing a gradual crossover to a truncated power law distribution as 
the numbers of agents increases. Other simulation parameters are: c = 0.3 and σ = 0.173. 
Actual market data are indicated by full dots with error bars. 
Figure 8 Sales correlation function of consumer data (dots) and simulation results (lines). 
Symbols denote: circular dots, auto-correlation; triangles, top-low cross-correlation; squares: 
low-low cross-correlation. Simulation parameters are: c = 0.3, σ = 0.173, and Nc = 46500. 
Figure 9 Sales auto-correlation function without social interaction between consumers 
(c = 0), for simulation parameters Nc = 48000, σ = 0.22 (slope –0.75) and for Nc = 52840, 
σ = 0.28 (slope –0.4). 
Figure 10 Distribution of consumer held prejudices qib, averaged over all brands, for two 
values of social co-operativity. Parameters are c = 0, Nc = 48000, σ = 0.22; and c = 0.3, 
Nc = 46500, σ = 0.173. 
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Market shares Relative fluctuation amplitude 
Brand 
real market simulation real market simulation 
Heinz 0.527 0.534 0.067 0.077 
Calve 0.196 0.195 0.110 0.119 
Gouda’s Glorie 0.148 0.145 0.081 0.122 
Remia 0.129 0.126 0.124 0.125 
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